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ABSTRACT. This paper argues that objective and subjective 
human capital may have substantial impact upon organiza- 
tional performance in a competitive context. Objective human 
capital pertains to such features as education and experience, 
whereas  subjective  human  capital  relates  to  personality 
characteristics. The argument is illustrated by presenting the 
results of two empirical studies: (1) a cross-section 1990-1991 
analysis  of  about  50  incumbents in  the  Flemish  furniture 
industry -  concentrating on the impact of subjective human 
capital, particularly the Chief Executive Officer's (CEO's) 
locus-of-control personality, on financial performance; and (2) 
a longitudinal 1970-1992 analysis of a cohort of 100 entrants 
into the Dutch audit industry -  focusing on the influence of 
objective human capital, particularly education and experi- 
ence, on exit by merger and acquisition (M&A) or "diaspora". 
Both studies support the claim that objective and subjective 
human capital matters: for example, Flemish furniture firms 
headed by a CEO with an internal locus-of-control trait reach 
higher levels of financial performance, and Dutch audit firms 
with a high proportion of personnel with business experience 
are more likely to exit the industry over the years as a result 
of diaspora.  Finally, the data  of the Flemish furniture and 
Dutch audit industries are re-analyzed so as  to compare the 
impact of human capital variables on small-firm performance 
in both industries. This re-analysis reveals that in both indus- 
tries the impact of human capital variables is more pronounced 
in large firms compared to small businesses. 
1.  Introduction  -  organizational  performance 
and human  capital 
The issue of organizational performance -  in terms 
of organizational  survival,  or entry  and  exit,  as 
well  as  financial  performance,  or  growth  and 
decline  -  attracts  much  attention  from  both 
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economic  and  sociological  disciplines.  In  eco- 
nomics, the contribution of industrial organization 
(IO)  is  particularly  revealing;  in  sociology, the 
two-decade history of organizational ecology (OE) 
is illustrative.  Both traditions  share  their  interest 
in explaining the ups and downs in the history of 
industries  and  organizations  (Boone  and  Van 
Witteloostuijn,  1995).  Where  IO  focuses  on 
market concentration,  OE deals with population 
density;  what  is  called  entry  and  exit  in  IO,  is 
known  as  founding  and  mortality  in  OE.  This 
paper  takes  both  perspectives  as  the  points  of 
departure  while  studying  organizational  perfor- 
mance,  hoping  that  such  eclecticism  generates 
added  value  in  the  search  for  determinants  of 
organizational  failure and success. 
In recent years, both IO and OE have enlarged 
their  scope by introducing  human  capital  argu- 
ments in their explanation  of organizational  per- 
formance.  A  clear example in the IO tradition  is 
Bates  (1990),  whereas  Preisend6rfer  and  Voss 
(1990) is an illustrative  study with an OE flavor. 
Here, the key argument is that the survival chances 
of  startups  increase  with  the  founder's  human 
capital.  Especially  the  founder's  education  and 
experience  are  considered  to  be  human  capital 
features that have a substantial impact on new firm 
performance. Still, however, to our knowledge the 
number of studies testing the significance of such 
human  capital  features  in  explaining  organiza- 
tional performance is limited indeed. 
Studies as Bates' (1990) and Preisend6rfer and 
Voss' (1990) focus on objective -  or observable - 
human  capital  features.  Apart  from  objective 
human  capital,  however,  subjective  -  or unob- 
servable  -  human  capital  may  play  a  role. 
Particularly entrepreneurial behavior research and 
top  management  studies  have  incorporated 
subjective human capital elements in the form of 
personality  traits.  For  example,  Miller  and 
Small Business Economics  8: 347-364,  1996. 
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Toulouse's (1986a)  findings reveal  that (small) 
firms headed by a Chief Executive Officer (CEO) 
with  an  internal  rather  than  external  locus-of- 
control  trait  are,  on  average,  associated  with 
organizational success.  Again, however, we are 
aware of only a limited number of organizational 
performance studies that have taken account of 
such subjective human capital features. 
The  key  argument  in  this  paper  is  that  our 
understanding of the driving forces behind orga- 
nizational  performance  can  be  deepened  by  a 
three-fold integration:  (1)  cross-fertilization of 
theories from economic and sociological disci- 
plines, particularly IO and OE;  (2)  introduction 
of objective and subjective human capital features; 
and (3) explanation of financial performance and 
organizational survival. The current paper takes up 
this challenge by adopting, though imperfectly, 
such an integrative perspective. The imperfection 
follows from the observation that the core of this 
paper -  two empirical studies -  focuses on pieces 
of the puzzle only. That is, the first study is  a 
cross-section  1990-1991  analysis  of  about  50 
incumbents in  the Flemish furniture industry - 
concentrating on the impact of subjective  human 
capital, particularly the  CEO's  locus-of-control 
personality, on financial performance -, whereas 
the  second  study  is  a  longitudinal  1970-1992 
analysis of a cohort of 100 entrants into the Dutch 
audit  industry  -  focusing  on  the  influence  of 
objective  human capital,  particularly personnel 
education  and  experience,  on  organizational 
survival. Moreover, the data of the Flemish furni- 
ture and Dutch audit industries are re-analyzed so 
as to compare the impact of human capital vari- 
ables  on  organizational  performance  in  both 
industries. This re-analysis focuses on small-firm 
performance in particular. Hopefully, the combi- 
nation of all pieces illustrates the added value of 
an integrative approach -  the puzzle -  to the study 
of organizational success and failure. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 
briefly reviews the literature from the angle of the 
integration of IO and OE.  Section 3 adds to this 
cross-fertilization arguments from human capital 
theory. Section 4 introduces the samples, measures 
and methods. Section 5 presents the findings from 
the first study in the Flemish furniture industry. 
Section 6 describes the second study's results on 
the  Dutch  audit  industry.  Section  7  compares 
results for both industries, with an emphasis on 
firm size effects. Section 8 is an appraisal. Note 
in  advance  that  detailed  information  on  both 
industry  studies  is  presented  in  Boone  and 
De  Brabander  (1994)  and  Boone  and  Van 
Witteloostuijn (1994a), respectively. 
2.  Industrial organization and organizational 
ecology -  matching theoretical modeling 
and empirical testing 
The issue of organizational performance is central 
to both IO and OE. The key -  dual -  question here 
is:  how is inter-organizational -  and thus market 
-  behavior shaped, and what does this imply for 
organizational -  and thus market -  performance? 
The number of books and papers devoted to the 
quest for answers to this fundamental question is 
sufficient to  stock  the  Empire  State  Building. 
Therefore, of course, in the context of the current 
paper both research traditions can only be char- 
acterized briefly with the aim to set the scene for 
this paper's attempt -  following the contributions 
of Bates (1990)  and Preisend6rfer and Voss (1990) 
referred to in the introduction -  to enrich the study 
of organizational and market behavior by intro- 
ducing human capital reasoning. Doing  so,  the 
focus is on the issue of market structure and firm 
survival. 
Firstly, modern IO has a strong footing in game 
theory  (Tirole,  1988).  With  the  help  of game- 
theoretic  tools  an  immense number of specific 
mathematical models of specific market structures 
has been produced (Fisher,  1989).  In the second 
half of the  1980s,  this  state of the  art  induced 
prominent scholars (including Tirole,  1988,  pp. 
3-4)  to advocate a  re-tipping of the balance in 
favor of an  increased empirical research effort 
[again, as the "old" structure-conduct-performance 
tradition was largely empirical in nature (Scherer 
and Ross,  1990)].  This is clear from the overall 
purport of reviews of the Handbook oflndustrial 
Organization  (Schmalensee  and  Willig,  1989) 
such as those of Fisher (1991), Porter (1991)  and 
Waterson (1992).  The key point is that, by and 
large,  modern  empirical  studies  (Schmalensee, 
1989)  are  only loosely coupled to the  stock of 
frontier game-theoretic modeling. An admirable 
attempt to move modern IO beyond (game) theory 
is Sutton (1991). Human Capital  349 
On the basis of decade-long (game-theoretic) 
modeling in the area of oligopoly theory Sutton 
(1991)  derives  a  number  of  illuminating 
hypotheses on the sunk cost -  market  structure 
nexus. The conduct element emerges through the 
sunk cost concept: in their quest for profitability 
firms  may  have  to  invest  in  their  competitive 
position by sinking cost in scale, advertising or 
R&D.  The  magnitude  and  nature  of sunk  cost 
competition ultimately determine market structure 
in terms of the mere number (in the terminology 
of OE: density) and size distribution (in terms of 
IO:  concentration)  of  firms.  Basically,  three 
market structures can emerge: concentrated, frag- 
mented and dual.  Concentrated and fragmented 
market structures are standard in the literature. A 
concentrated  market  is  characterized  by  low 
density  and  high  concentration,  whereas  the 
opposite is true for a fragmented structure (Panzar, 
1989).  The dual market structure so far received 
less attention in the literature: then, high density 
goes  hand  in  hand  with  high  concentration. A 
theoretical example of the analysis of dual market 
structures  is  the  modeling  of small-firm  entry 
accommodation -  a competitive fringe -  by large- 
firm market leaders (Gilbert,  1989). 
The  issue  of firm  survival  -  and  its  mirror 
image: firm exit -  is relatively underemphasized 
within IO (Van Witteloostuijn, 1995). In the 1980s, 
a countable number of exit models appeared in the 
literature -  initiating contributions being Jovanovic 
(1982)  and Ghemawat and Nalebuff (1985).  By 
and large, exit modeling within IO focuses on the 
survival-enhancing impact of efficiency and size. 
For  example,  Ghemawat  and  Nalebuff  (1985, 
1990) argue that in the absence of substantial scale 
economies large firms facing declining demand 
have to decide to exit first, and Jovanovic (1982) 
and Jovanovic and Lach (1989) model a survival- 
of-the-fittest environment in which efficient firms 
drive  their  inefficient rivals  from  the  market. 
Empirical  IO  studies  on  exit  are  scarce.  On 
average,  however,  the  empirical  contributions 
reveal that small and young firms have the highest 
failure rates (Dunne et al., 1988,  1989). Moreover, 
Audretsch  (1994)  is  an  example  of  a  study 
revealing  the  negative  impact  of (contempora- 
neous) concentration on survival rates. ~ 
Secondly, OE is basically a large set of empir- 
ical studies into the long-run evolution of popu- 
lations  of organizations  (Hannan  and Freeman, 
1989).  Contrary to IO, its theoretic basis is not 
strikingly sophisticated. Rather, OE studies typi- 
cally jump into the empirical part of their under- 
taking  after  a  brief  and  non-mathematical 
introduction  of  testable  hypotheses.  As  far  as 
market structure is concerned, the key hypothesis 
of OE is that the evolution of population density 
reveals a logistic pattern. That is, the number of 
organizations within a population (in terms of IO: 
market)  initially  grows  slowly  (embryonic 
market), then increases rapidly (growth market), 
and subsequently stabilizes (mature market) before 
dropping down (declining market). This prediction 
is deduced from an elementary theory of compe- 
tition and legitimation (Hannan and Carroll, 1992, 
pp.  25-44).  In the empirical arena, OE's predic- 
tion  of  the  logistic  evolution  of  density  has 
survived tests in a large number of populations, 
varying from American labor unions (Hannan and 
Freeman, 1987,  1988) to Irish newspapers (Carroll 
and Hannan,  1989a). 
An interesting parallel with IO's dual market 
structure  argument is  the  resource  partitioning 
model  within  OE  (Carroll,  1985).  The  key 
argument in this model is that the resource space 
within a population can be divided into segments 
that are separated in the sense that within-segment 
competition  dominates  over  between-segment 
rivalry. Here, the elaboration of Baum and Mezias 
(1992) relates to IO's dual market structure notion. 
That is, Baum and Mezias (1992) argue that within 
a population  small firms compete against small 
rivals, and large firms face competition from large 
competitors. The resource partitioning model has 
been  confirmed  for,  e.g.,  the  U.S.  newspaper 
(Carroll, 1985) and brewery (Hannan and Carroll, 
1992)  industries. Boeker (1991) is an example of 
a study that successfully links the OE argument on 
resource partitioning with the IO-related concept 
of strategic groups (Caves and Porter, 1977) on the 
basis of U.S. brewery data. 
Hannan and Carroll  (1992)  nicely summarize 
the robust empirical findings within OE relating 
to the survival-enhancing features of organizations 
that have to operate in a  selective environment. 
The three basic  organizational features relating 
to the issue of firm  survival  that emerge in OE 
studies are age, change and size. Moreover, envi- 
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over time, is assumed to determine  failure  rates. 
Basically, the theoretical argument and empirical 
evidence suggest, by and large,  that  the chances 
of a firm's  survival increase with organizational 
age  and  size,  and  decrease  with  environmental 
density (contemporaneous  and  at founding)  and 
organizational  change.  The  negative  impact  of 
density at founding is called the delayed-density 
effect, which is due to the imprinted downside of 
competition  for  scarce  resources  in  an  over- 
crowded population (Carroll and Hannan,  1989b). 
That  is,  unfavorable  circumstances  at  founding 
have  a  longlasting  (negative)  impact  on  the 
entrants'  survival  chances  for  (at  least)  two 
reasons:  first,  organizations  entering  an  over- 
crowded population  are forced into unattractive 
niches; and, second, in high density environments 
entrants  are  only  able  to  obtain  limited  and/or 
inferior resources. 
This  paper  explores  the  IO-OE  interface  by 
focusing on three hypotheses related to the issues 
of  market  structure  and  organizational  perfor- 
mance.  Hypothesis  l a  implies  a  replication  of 
many OE studies on the density-delay argument. 
Hypothesis lb focuses on the density-delay effect 
on small-firm  survival.  Hypothesis  lc  transfers 
OE's delay argument to IO's notion of concentra- 
tion,  but pertaining  to  large-firm  survival.  The 
combined Hypothesis lb-c goes for an indirect test 
of  the  dual  market  structure  (IO)  or  resource 
partitioning  (OE)  theories  in  the  Dutch  audit 
industry, both predicting that direct competition is 
size-dependent.  The  descriptive  statistics  of the 
Dutch  audit  industry  (Table  V  below)  clearly 
suggest a  dual market  structure:  for instance,  in 
1975 the four largest audit firms controlled 50.6% 
of a market with a total of 271 audit firms (Boone 
and  Van  Witteloostuijn,  1995).  Note  that  the 
industry-specific application of the hypotheses is 
simply  the  result  of  limited  data  availability. 
Therefore,  for each  (sub)hypothesis the relevant 
industry is indicated between brackets. 
H1  Competition  at founding:  (a)  density  at  founding 
decreases survival chances of entrants, (b) density at 
founding decreases survival chances for small but not 
for large entrants,  and  (c) concentration at founding 
decreases survival chances for large but not for small 
entrants  (Dutch audit industry). 
Hypothesis 2 implies a straightforward application 
of the IO and OE argument that a firm's survival 
chances are facilitated by favorable demand (IO) 
or carrying capacity (OE) conditions at the date of 
founding. 
H2  Demand  at  founding:  Firms  founded  in  growth 
markets  with  high  demand  have  higher  survival 
chances (Dutch audit industry). 
Finally, Hypothesis 3 concentrates on the effect of 
size on organizational  performance.  As far as the 
size-profitability nexus is concerned, the argument 
is  that  "it  depends".  For  example,  within  IO 
oligopolist collusion  and  scale economies point 
to a positive correlation  while Bertrand  competi- 
tion and niche advantages imply a negative or zero 
effect. Therefore,  Hypothesis 3a is a null bench- 
mark only. On the size-survival issue, the findings 
in  the  literature  are  largely  congruent.  Both  IO 
and  OE studies have revealed that  firm  survival 
is  positively  correlated  with  firm  (startup  and 
current)  size.  For  example,  Audretsch  (1994) 
reports  a  negative impact  of startup  size on the 
likelihood of plant exit in a sample of about 8000 
1976  entrants  in  U.S.  industries.  This  is 
Hypothesis 3b. 
H3  Current size and size at founding:  Larger firms are 
associated  with  (a)  higher  financial  performance 
(Flemish furniture  industry)  and  (b)  larger entrants 
have higher survival chances (Dutch audit industry). 
By  way  of summary,  the  purport  of the  above 
argument is that modern IO generated much theory 
without extensive empirical  testing,  whereas OE 
has  produced  much  empirical  work  without 
sophisticated theory grounding.  A cross-fertiliza- 
tion between both traditions -  in terms of results 
as well  as  attitudes  -  is  likely  to induce  added 
value  (Boone  and  Van  Witteloostuijn,  1995). 
Table  I  summarizes  the  key IO-OE differences. 
Note that Table I's characterization is not absolute, 
but rather indicates differences in emphasis. 
Two differences in emphasis  need  additional 
explanation. 2 First,  a  key issue in the debate on 
market evolution is what dominates  in practice: 
environmental selection or organizational  adapta- 
tion.  Here,  OE  takes  an  extreme  position  by 
arguing  that organizations  are -  and  must be so 
as to survive -  (relatively) inert.  This view is in 
contrast with  mainstream  IO,  which  focuses on 
organizational adaptation (and thus organizational 
flexibility)  through  the  examination  of  profit- Human Capital  351 
TABLE I 
IO and OE compared 
Element  Emphasis 
Industrial  Organizational 
organization  ecology 
Discipline  Economics  Sociology 
Orientation  Theoretical  Empirical 
Data  Cross-section  Longitudinal 
Firm  Flexibility  Inertia 
Market  Concentration  Density 
Performance  Profitability  Survival 
maximizing  strategy  choices  (Boone  and  Van 
Witteloostuijn,  1994b). Second, the very assump- 
tion of profit-maximizing behavior that dominates 
IO research implies a focus on profitability as the 
evaluation  benchmark  while assessing organiza- 
tional  performance.  OE,  to  the  contrary,  argues 
that  mere survival  is the ultimate  test of organi- 
zational  performance  (Carroll  and  Harrison, 
1993). 3 
As far as the IO-OE interface is concerned, the 
current paper focuses on the issues of dual market 
structures, demand conditions and organizational 
size  dependencies.  To  be  honest,  the  current 
paper's  contribution  to  theory development  is 
modest.  That  is,  on  the  theoretical  side  the 
argument  follows  the  lead  of  such  scholars  as 
Bates (1990)  and Preisend6rfer  and  Voss (1990) 
by  introducing  human  capital  variables  into  a 
(non-mathematical)  framework  that  aims  at 
explaining organizational performance. This is the 
message of the next section. 
3.  Human capital and organizational 
performance -  objective and subjective 
features of CEOs and personnel 
The  proposition  that  human  capital  matters  for 
organizational  performance is well-known in  lit- 
eratures  on  entrepreneurial  behavior  and  top 
management  functioning.  Table  II  classifies the 
literature  as to their  focus on  two elements:  (1) 
objective and/or subjective human capital; and (2) 
financial  performance  and/or  organizational 
survival.  Moreover, Table II contains -  if known 
-  one illustrative  example of a  study per combi- 
nation of elements. 
The number of studies which include objective 
human  capital  variables  in  their  search  for 
explanations  of  organizational  performance  is 
increasing,  the contributions of Bates (1990) and 
Preisend6rfer  and  Voss  (1990)  referred  to  in 
the  introduction  being  clear  examples.  Section 
6  reports  the  results  of  Boone  and  Van 
Witteloostuijn (1994a), concentrating on explain- 
ing  organizational  survival  with  the  help  of 
objective human  capital  variables.  The  contribu- 
tion of Eisenhardt  and Schoonhoven (1990) is an 
example of a  study directed at explaining  finan- 
cial performance after including objective human 
capital variables. 4 They argue that ventures newly 
established  in  (i)  growth  markets  with  (ii)  low 
concentration and founded by (iii) a large team of 
entrepreneurs  with (iv) high variation in industry 
experience  reveal  higher  growth  rates.  On  the 
basis of the analysis of a sample of 92 U.S. semi- 
conductor  ventures  newly  established  in  the 
1978-1985 period they report supportive evidence 
for predictions (i), (iii) and (iv), but not for (ii). 
TABLE II 
(Non)integrative  studies 
Performance  Human Capital 
Objective  Subjective  Both 
Financial  performance  Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven  Boone and De Brabander 
(1990):  92 U.S. semiconductor  (1994):  about 50 Flemish 
ventures  furniture firms 
Boone and Van Witteloostuijn  Brockhaus (1980):  31 U.S. 
(1994a):  100 audit firm startups  founders  of new businesses  ? 
?  ?  ? 
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In the field of top management studies, a strand 
of  literature  focuses  on  the  role  of  subjective 
human  capital -  in the form of personality traits 
of managers  (particularly  CEOs) -  on  financial 
performance. Section 5 below summarizes the key 
findings  of  Boone  and  De  Brabander  (1994), 
focusing on the explanatory power of the CEO's 
locus-of-control trait.  Studies explaining  organi- 
zational  survival chances  with reference to sub- 
jective  human  capital  features  are  scarce.  An 
intuitive  reason  for  this  observation  is  that  a 
longitudinal  study  of the  founder personality  - 
firm  survival nexus is difficult to accomplish as 
the personality traits of the founders of failed firms 
are difficult to trace in an  ex post  analysis. 5 The 
explorative  study of Brockhaus  (1980)  is a rare 
example  of  this  type  of  research.  Brockhaus 
(1980) collected (questionnaire) data on about 30 
founders  of new  businesses  in  the  U.S.  at  two 
points in time:  shortly after they had entered the 
market, and a follow-up three years later. His main 
finding  is that  successful entrepreneurs  reveal a 
more internal  locus-of-control personality. 
Studies that  focus on both  objective and  sub- 
jective human capital and/or financial performance 
and organizational survival are, as far as we know, 
virtually absent (cf. note 4). Govindarajan (1989) 
is a rare example of an empirical study that seeks 
to explain  financial  performance  with  objective 
and  subjective  human  capital  variables. 6  His 
analysis of the performance of 121 SBUs of large 
U.S.  firms  reveals  that  the  SBU's  general 
manager's  functional  background,  general  man- 
agement experience, industry familiarity, locus-of- 
control  trait  and  problem-solving  style  are 
important  determinants  of the  SBUs'  effective- 
ness. 
The  current  paper  adopts  five  hypotheses 
related  to  the  features  of CEOs  and  personnel. 
First,  following  agency  theory  arguments,  a 
number  of  studies  incorporated  an  ownership 
structure  variable in their effort to explain orga- 
nizational performance. For example, Oswald and 
Jahera's (1991) findings suggest that firms headed 
by  managers  with  own-company  shares  show 
significantly  higher performance,  and Audretsch 
(1994)  reports  that  independent  entrants  have 
higher  survival  rates  than  newly  established 
branch  plants  and  subsidiaries.  This  argument  is 
reflected in Hypothesis 4. 
H4  Current ownership  and ownership  at founding:  (a) 
firms  currently headed  by (family of) the  founder 
generate  higher  financial  performance  (Flemish 
furniture  industry) and (b) firms with a higher pro- 
portion of owner-managers at founding have higher 
survival chances (Dutch audit industry). 
Second and third, studies as those of Bates (1990), 
Preisend6rfer and Voss (1990) and Briiderl  et al. 
(1992) reveal that organizational  success is facil- 
itated by general  human  capital -  specifically in 
the form of increased schooling of the founders - 
and  specific  human  capital  -  particularly  the 
founders'  previous  (management)  experience 
inside or outside the current firm and/or industry. 
Hypothesis 5  focuses on  general  human  capital 
(education), and Hypothesis 6 on specific human 
capital (experience). 
H5  Education of current CEO and education of  personnel 
at founding:  (a) firms currently headed by a highly 
educated  CEO are associated  with  higher  financial 
performance (Flemish furniture industry) and (b) firms 
with  highly  educated  personnel  at  founding have 
higher survival chances (Dutch audit industry). 
H6  Business  experience  of current  CEO and  business 
experience  of personnel  at  founding:  (a)  firms 
currently headed  by  a  CEO  with  much  business 
experience  generate  higher  financial performance 
(Flemish furniture industry) and (b) firms with highly 
experienced personnel (in business) at founding reveal 
higher survival chances (Dutch audit industry). 
Fourth, as said above, a substantial number of top 
management  studies  emphasizes  the  favorable 
influence of an  internal  locus-of-control person- 
ality,  particularly  the  CEO's,  on  organizational 
performance.  The  argument  here  is  that  CEOs 
believing that they can control their fate by their 
own effort and skill, implying internality, are more 
effective managers  (Thomas  et al.,  1991).  This 
line of reasoning is formulated in Hypothesis 7. 
H7  Locus-of-control  of current  CEO:  Firms currently 
headed by a CEO with an internal locus-of-control 
personality are associated with higher financial per- 
formance (Flemish furniture industry). 
Fifth and finally, the impact of the entrepreneur's 
human capital features may be more pronounced 
in smaller firms, since the communication capacity 
and span of control of managers are limited. This 
may explain why this type of research is particu- 
larly popular in the context of the study of small 
business performance.  Hypothesis 8 captures this 
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H8  Size effect:. The impact of human capital features of 
the CEO or personnel (H4-7)  is stronger in smaller 
firms (Flemish furniture and Dutch audit industries). 
Of course, all hypotheses are ceteris paribus.  That 
is, it may well be that important interaction effects 
prevail in a number of cases. For example, perhaps 
highly educated and experienced entrepreneurs are 
better able to handle  a  large number of subordi- 
nates or to trace market opportunities that permit 
large-scale  entry.  The  current  paper,  however, 
gives only  limited  attention  to  such  interaction 
effects, given the small samples at hand. 
The  findings relating  to Hypotheses 3a and  7 
on the Flemish furniture industry are presented in 
Section 5, and the results for the Hypotheses 1  a- 
b-c,  2,  3b,  4b,  5b  and  6b  on  the  Dutch  audit 
industry  are  reported  in  Section  6.  Finally, 
Hypotheses 4a, 5a, 6a and 8 are tested on the basis 
of the  re-analysis  of the  data  in  Section  7.  In 
advance,  two remarks  are  worth  making.  First, 
Hypotheses 1-3 have their origin in IO and/or OE 
(Section 2), Hypothesis 4 originates from agency 
theory, Hypotheses 5-7  are based upon comple- 
mentary human capital arguments (Section 3), and 
Hypothesis  8  is  related  to  the  small  business 
economics  literature  (Section  7).  Second,  the 
Flemish furniture industry research as well as the 
Dutch  audit  industry  study  focuses on  specific 
topics next to the issues reflected in Hypotheses 
1-8.  Specifically, the Flemish furniture  industry 
research concentrates on the role of strategies of 
cost  leadership  versus  product  differentiation, 
whereas  the  study  on  the  Dutch  audit  industry 
differentiates the results  for exit by merger and 
acquisition  (M&A) or diaspora.  Table  III  sum- 
marizes the hypotheses. 
4.  Samples, measures and methods 
The  study  of the  Flemish  furniture  industry  is 
based  upon  a  sample  of the  largest  (with  total 
assets above $1.2 million) Flemish furniture firms 
in  1990 (Boone,  1992).  CEOs of 81  firms were 
interviewed in 1990-1991, and 64 CEOs returned 
one  or  two  of the  administered  questionnaires. 
Next to the interviews and questionnaires,  finan- 
cial  reports  were  consulted.  The  variables  are 
listed in Table IV,  including  their  measures  and 
descriptive statistics. 
The cross-section data were analyzed with OLS 
and  hierarchical  regression  analysis.  Details  on 
samples,  measures  and  methods  are reported  in 
Boone  and  De  Brabander  (1994).  The  major 
findings are presented in Section 5. 
The study of the Dutch audit industry pertains 
to the nearly complete  set of 100 new firms that 
entered  the  market  in  the  1970-1975  period 
(Maijoor et al.,  1995).  The  data  were  collected 
from the membership lists of the professional body 
of Dutch registered  auditors  (RAs), "Nederlands 
TABLE III 
Hypotheses 
Hypothesis  Predicted effect 
Flemish furniture industry  Dutch audit industry 
la:  Density at founding -  finn survival 
lb:  Density at founding -  small-firm survival 
lc:  Concentration at founding -  large-firm survival 
2:  Demand at founding -  organizational survival 
3a:  Current size -  financial performance 
3b:  Size at founding -  organizational survival 
4a:  Current (family of) founder-owner -  financial performance 
4b:  Proportion of owner-managers at founding -  organizational survival 
5a:  Education of current CEO -  financial performance 
5b:  Education of personnel at founding -  organizational survival 
6a:  Business experience of current CEO -  financial performance 
6b:  Experience of personnel at founding -  organizational survival 
7:  Internal locus-of-control current CEO -  financial performance 
8:  Human capital features -  small-firm performance 
Not tested  Negative 
Not tested  Negative 
Not tested  Negative 
Not tested  Positive 
Positive  Not tested 
Not tested  Positive 
Positive  Not tested 
Not tested  Positive 
Positive  Not tested 
Not tested  Positive 
Positive  Not tested 
Not tested  Positive 
Positive  Not tested 
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TABLE IV 
Flemish furniture industry study: measures and statistics 
Variables  Measures  Statistics* 





Locus-of-control  The Rotter questionnaire with 37 forced-choice items  Mean 
(including 14 filler items) with low scores indicating externality  SD 
and high scores implying internality  Maximum 
Minimum 
N 
Cost leadership  A combination of three proxies -  distribution intensity,  Mean 
Computer Numerical Control investment and price charged  SD 
relative to competitors  Maximum 
Minimum 
N 
Product differentiation  A combination of three proxies -  advertising intensity, product  Mean 




Performance  A combination of three proxies -  cash flow on assets, return  Mean 
on assets and price-cost margin, all averaged over two-year  SD 




-  76.1 
417 
=  10 
62 
14.7 
-  3.4 
~21 
=6 
=  62 
-0 
=1 
=  3.6 
=  -1.3 
-  41 
-0 
=1 
-  2.9 
m -1.2 
-  41 
=0 
-  2.5 
-2.7 
-  59 
* SD -  standard deviation and N ffi number of observations. 
Instituut voor Register Accountants" (NIvRA). All 
RAs  are  obliged  by  law  to  be  member  of the 
NIvRA (being the monopolist body of RAs since 
1967). The list of variables, measures and descrip- 
tive statistics is reported in Table V. 
The longitudinal data were analyzed with uni- 
variate mean comparisons and logistic regression 
analyses. Details on the samples, measures and 
methods  are  presented  in  Boone  and  Van 
Witteloostuijn  (1994a).  The  main  results  are 
discussed in Section 6. 
Both industries are, in many ways, radically dif- 
ferent. In black-and-white shades the following 
elements characterize the main differences. The 
Flemish furniture industry, on the one hand, is 
fragmented without large-firm market leaders, has 
a  century-long tradition  of family business,  is 
associated  with  substantial  export  and  import 
flows, is supplier of retail trade firms and produces 
a physical craft product requiring low to moder- 
ately educated labor. The Dutch audit industry, on 
the  other  hand,  is  highly  concentrated  with  a 
dominant top-five of market leaders,  is  a  non- 
family business with a primarily post-war history, 
is a national market without international trade, 
supplies directly to end consumers and produces 
an  intellectual  professional  service  requiring 
highly educated personnel. Section 7  includes a 
comparative analysis -  as far as possible -  of both 
industries so as to unravel, though tentatively only, 
industry and size effects. 
5.  The flemish furniture industry -  subjective 
human capital and financial performance 
The original purpose of the cross-section study in 
the Flemish furniture industry was to examine the 
relative importance of a specific personality trait 
of CEOs -  locus-of-control -  in determining finan- 
cial performance. For detailed results and inter- Human Capital 
Table V 
Dutch audit industry study: measures and statistics 
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Variables  Measures  Statistics 
Density  The total number of audit firms in the industry 







Number of registered auditors, being either employee or 
partner of the firm 
Proportion of auditors who are partner of the firm 
Proportion of employee and partner auditors of the firm who 
have an academic certificate 
Proportion of employee and partner auditors of the firm who 
have worked in (an) other organization(s) (audit or otherwise) 
Period  1970-1973  without demand-stimulating legislation (1), 
and period  1974-1975  with such legislation (0) 
Status in 1992 -  survivor, M&A, diaspora or otherwise 
1970  : 306 firms 
1971  : 284 firms 
1972  : 270 firms 
1973  : 267 firms 
1974  : 265  firms 
1975  : 271  firms 
1970  : 36.4% 
1971  : 37.3% 
1972  : 49.0% 
1973  : 50.8% 
1974  : 50.4% 
1975  : 50.6% 
Mean  =  3.2 
SD  =  5.55 
Maximum  =  41 
Minimum  =  1 
N  =  100 
Mean  = 0.95 
SD  = 0.14 
Maximum  =  1 
Minimum  =  0.33 
N  =  100 
Mean  =  0.31 
SD  =  0.40 
Maximum  =  1 
Minimum  = 0 
N  =  100 
Mean  = 0.70 
SD  = 0.44 
Maximum  =  1 
Minimum  = 0 
N  =  100 
1970-1973  .  : 61  entrants 
1974-1975  : 39 entrants 
Survivor  : 42 firms 
M&A  : 27 firms 
Diaspora  : 9 firms 
Otherwise  : 22 firms 
pretations,  we refer to Boone and De Brabander 
(1994). Here, we focus on the influence of orga- 
nizational size and CEO's locus-of-control. As far 
as the impact of organizational  size is concerned, 
H3a is  the  benchmark.  In  the  literature  on  top 
management studies, the argument is that internal 
CEOs reveal more effective strategic  leadership 
and  so  generate  higher  financial  performance 
(Boone and De Brabander,  1993). This may be due 
to the fact that internal  CEOs are better formula- 
tors (Miller and Toulouse, 1986a,b) and/or imple- 
mentors (Govindarajan,  1989) of strategic choices. 
Either way, financial  performance is expected to 
correlate  positively  with  the  CEO's  internality. 
This  is  H7.  The  OLS  regression  estimates  are 
reported in Table VI.  7 
First, as far as the impact of organizational size 
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TABLE VI 
Subjective human capital and financial performance in 
Flemish furniture firms: the effect of the CEO 
locus-of-control trait 
Variables  Regression  Partial 
coefficient  ~  correlation 
Intercept  -1.373"*  (0.581)  - 
Size  -0.003*  (0.002)  -0.25* 
Locus-of-control  0.107"**  (0.038)  0.36*** 
F-value  5.388*** 
R-square  0.172 
Sample size  55 
a Unstandardized regression coefficient with  * p  <  0.10, 
￿9  * p  <  0.05  and *** p  < 0.01,  and standard error in paren- 
thesis. 
significant (p < 0.10).  However, the estimated sign 
opposes  the  prediction  of H3a  (with  a  partial 
correlation coefficient of-0.25):  that is,  smaller 
firms seem to generate higher levels of financial 
performance than their larger counterparts. The 
negative impact of size may be explained by the 
two-fold observation that (i) economies of scale 
i'n production are absent, as furniture production 
is largely based on craftmenship [cf. Audretsch 
and Mahmood (1994)  on the intermediating role 
of scale economies], and (ii) wages are higher in 
larger firms, due to Belgian institutional arrange- 
ments and bargaining procedures. 
Second, H7 is clearly confirmed. Internality is 
positively and significantly correlated with finan- 
cial performance (with a partial correlation coef- 
ficient of 0.36  and p  <  0.01).  To control for the 
possible intermediating effect of (the formulation 
and/or implementation of) strategic choices, the 
furniture firms in the sample are characterized as 
pursuing  a  strategy of either cost leadership or 
product differentiation (Porter,  1980).  Again, the 
effect of organizational size is estimated (H3a). 
The results of a hierarchical regression analysis 
are depicted in Table VII.  8 
The effect of organizational size is now statis- 
tically insignificant. The finding that CEO inter- 
nality facilitates financial performance survives 
the introduction of the strategy variables.  With 
cost leadership and product differentiation strate- 
gies held constant,  internal  CEOs  reach higher 
levels of financial performance.  9 So, in our sample 
of Flemish furniture firms the positive influence 
of a particular manifestation of subjective human 
capital -  the CEO's locus-of-control personality 
trait  -  on  financial  performance is  statistically 
significant. 
TABLE VII 
Subjective human capital and financial performance in Flemish furniture firms: the intermediating role of competitive strategy  ~ 
Regression 1  Regression 2 
Regression coefficient  b  Partial correlation  Regression coefficient  b  Partial correlation 
Set 1 
Intercept  -1.550"* (0.731) 
Size  -0.001  (0.002) 





Intercept  -1.550"* (0.731) 
Size  -0.001  (0.002) 








-  -1.983"**  (0.707)  - 
-0.12  -0.002  (0.002)  -0.20 
0.36**  0.143"**  (0.047)  0.45*** 
-0.342**  (0.158)  -0.34** 
3.561"* 
0.234 
-  -1.453"*  (0.633)  - 
-0.12  --0.002  (0.002)  --0.15 
0.36**  0.102"*  (0.042)  0.38** 
0.443*** (0.135)  0.48*** 
5.881"** 
0.34 
a  N-39. 
b  Unstandardized regression coefficient with * p  < 0.10, ** p  < 0.05 and *** p  < 0.01, and standard error in parenthesis. Human Capital  357 
6.  The Dutch audit industry -  objective 
human capital  and organizational  survival 
The Dutch audit industry analyses were designed 
as  an  exploratory  pilot  study  into  the  survival 
chances  of entering  firms.  For this  purpose,  the 
complete set of firms that entered into the industry 
in the 1970-1975 period were selected from a data 
base covering the  1880-1990 era (Buijink et al., 
1995). The key issue in this study was to examine 
whether  differently  characterized  entrants  -  in 
terms of IO/OE and human capital features at the 
date  of founding  -  are  associated with  specific 
destinations.  Detailed information on the study is 
reported in Boone and Van Witteloostuijn (1994a). 
As far as entry characteristics  are concerned,  we 
focused on the overall  impact of density  (Hl a), 
size  (H3b),  ownership  (H4b), education  (H5b), 
business experience (H6b) and carrying  capacity 
(H2) at the date of founding. Moreover, the inter- 
action effect of competition at founding and orga- 
nizational size (reflecting the dual market structure 
argument)  is captured by Hlb,c. Additionally,  in 
1992  three  destinations  were  distinguished:  (i) 
survival;  (ii) M&A; and (iii) diaspora? ~ An audit 
firm A is said to merge with (or to be acquired by) 
a  firm  B  if the  majority  of firm  A's  personnel 
continues  his  or  her  career  as  partner  (or 
employee) within  a  new  firm  C  (or  within  the 
acquiring  firm  B).  Diaspora  implies  that  the 
personnel of firm A moves into various directions: 
for example, from a  firm A  with seven auditors 
two start a new firm, three continue their career as 
an  internal  auditor within  large enterprises,  and 
two become partner  of a  larger  incumbent  audit 
firm B. ~1 Given the limited sample size, Table VIII 
reports the results of a non-parametric comparison 
of means (Kruskal-Wallis ANOVA one-tailed). 12 
The  test of two hypotheses generates  statisti- 
cally  significant  results.  First,  if  M&A  and 
diaspora  are  interpreted  as  exit  of independent 
legal  identities,  then  H3b  is  clearly  falsified: 
smaller  entrants  (with  mean  1.74  for  surviving 
firms)  have  higher  survival  chances  than  their 
larger counterparts (with mean 4.41 for M&A and 
9.11  for  diaspora).  Second,  if  M&A  firms  are 
assumed to survive as a group of united auditors, 
H4b receives support: the proportion of owners is 
considerably higher in surviving (with mean 0.98) 
and  M&A (with  mean  0.95)  firms  compared to 
their diaspora rivals (with mean 0.79). 
Three  pairwise  comparisons  of means  reveal 
an  additional  number  of statistically  significant 
differences  (applying  Mann-Whitney  one-tailed 
tests).  First,  the size difference stands the test of 
all three pairwise comparisons, which confirms the 
above falsification of H3b.  Second,  M&A firms 
embody  more  human  capital  -  that  is,  higher 
educated personnel  -  at the founding date  (with 
mean 0.42) than their surviving rivals (with mean 
0.31). Third, at the date of founding the personnel 
of diaspora firms has  more business experience 
(with mean  0.98) than  their M&A and  surviving 
counterparts  (with means  0.77  and  0.64, respec- 
tively). The  latter two findings  oppose H5b and 
H6b. That is, firms with highly educated personnel 
at founding  have higher  mortality rates  through 
M&A  and  firms  with  highly  experienced  per- 
sonnel  at founding reveal a  higher  likelihood of 
exit by diaspora.  An explanation  of this two-fold 
result may be that highly educated and/or highly 
experienced auditors have more opportunities  to 
TABLE VIII 
Objective human capital and organizational survival in Dutch audit firms: the impact of education and experience  a 
Variables  Surviving firms (N -  42)  M&A firms (N -  27)  Diaspora firms (N -  9)  Kruskal-Wallis ANOVA  b 
Density  278.98  (16.27)  275.74 (13.94)  280.00 (19.58)  0.819 
Size  1.74  (1.68)  4.41  (5.41)  9.11  (12.44)  0.000 
Ownership  0.98  (0.08)  0.95  (0.15)  0.79  (0.27)  0.007 
Education  0.31  (0.43)  0.42  (0.38)  0.34  (0.37)  0.313 
Experience  0.64  (0.46)  0.77  (0.40)  0.98  (0.07)  0.153 
Demand  0.55  (0.50)  0.59  (0.50)  0.67  (0.50)  0.792 
a  Average values are reported with standard deviation in parenthesis. 
b  One-tailed p-value with statistically significant values printed in bold. 358  Christophe Boone and Arjen van Witteloostuijn 
move up the career ladder by joining larger audit 
firms  or  outside  enterprises  than  their  lower 
educated and/or less experienced colleagues. That 
is, auditors with less human capital -  in terms of 
education  and/or  experience  -  are  "forced"  to 
remain  self-employed in small  audit firms in the 
face of their  limited  career opportunities  in  the 
outside world. Moreover, (larger) audit firms with 
highly educated (and  at least moderately experi- 
enced)  personnel  are  probably  more  attractive 
takeover candidates. 
Remarks  on  the  explanatory  power  of three 
remaining  variables -  concentration,  density and 
demand at founding (HI and H2), all three related 
to IO and OE -  may complete the discussion of 
the  results.  For  one,  the  insignificance  of  the 
period  variable  (founded  between  1970-1973) 
implies that H2, on the favorable impact of higher 
demand, is not supported: the observation whether 
firms have entered the market in times of (rela- 
tively)  low  (1970-1973)  or  high  (1974-1975) 
demand fails to contribute to the explanation  of 
their survival chances. This is in accordance with 
the (confirmed) hypothesis of Bradburd and Caves 
(1982) and Audretsch (1994) that industry growth 
does not  affect industry  profitability  (Bradburd 
and  Caves,  1982)  and  establishment  exit 
(Audretsch,  1994) in the long run.  As far as the 
density-delay  argument  is  concerned,  for  the 
complete  sample  the  result  does  not  reach  a 
statistically  significant  level. Hence, Hla is not 
supported. 
Finally, the results reported in Table VIII cannot 
TABLE IX 
A  dual market structure in the Dutch audit industry: 
concentration, density and size-dependent competition  a 
Independent variables  Small firms  b  Large firms  b 
(N ~  43)  (N m 26) 
Density at founding  0.06  -0.36** 
Concentration at founding  -0.05  0.28* 
a  Correlation coefficients between density and concentration 
at founding on the one hand and  survival  on the other are 
reported. Superscripts *  and  ** indicate statistically signifi- 
cant  correlation  coefficients  at  the  0.10  and  0.05  level, 
respectively (one-tailed test). 
b  Dependent variable:  M&A finn ~  1 and  surviving finn 
0. Diaspora finns are excluded because they always have more 
than one auditor. 
be  applied  to  test  the  dual  market  argument 
reflected  in  Hlb,c.  For  this  purpose,  Table  IX 
depicts the impact of concentration and density at 
founding on the  survival chances  of large  (more 
than one auditor) and small (one auditor) entrants 
for the subsample of surviving and M&A firms. 
The  findings  produce  partial  support  for the 
dual market structure argument (Hlb,c). For one, 
all signs are in the predicted direction: small-firm 
survival is impeded by high  density (with a cor- 
relation  of 0.06)  and not by high  concentration 
(with a correlation of-0.05) at founding, whereas 
large-scale entrants suffer from the exit-enhancing 
impact of high  concentration  (with  a correlation 
of 0.28) but not from high density (with a corre- 
lation of-0.36).  Moreover, the expected correla- 
tion  is statistically  significant  for the  subsample 
of large firms (p < 0.1). Hence, the results suggest 
t  . 
that  competition  is  size-dependent,  with  small 
firms  competing  against  small  rivals  and  their 
large counterparts against large firms. This finding 
perhaps explains why the empirical studies on the 
influence  of  concentration  on  organizational 
performance have produced ambiguous evidence 
(compare,  for  example,  Schoonhoven  and 
Eisenhardt's,  1990,  with  Audretsch's,  1994, 
findings).  With a  sample of small firms, concen- 
tration  may fail  to have  any effect on organiza- 
tional  performance  if competition  is  ruled  by a 
dual market structure. 
7.  Both industries  compared -  the size effect 
of human capital 
As both studies were not designed as parts of an 
overall comparative research effort, the compar- 
ison can be but imperfect. However, the Flemish 
furniture  data set contains a number of variables 
(Boone,  1992)  that  are  close  to  the  objective 
human  capital  measures  in  the  Dutch  audit 
industry study -  particularly a measure of owner- 
ship, education and experience. Table X lists and 
compares both studies'  measures that are central 
in the comparative analysis presented below. To 
(re-)trace  the impact of covariates,  a number of 
non-comparable  variables  is  included  as  well 
(CEO's locus-of-control for the Flemish furniture 
industry,  and density and demand for the Dutch 
audit industry). 




Variables  Measures 








Rotter questionnaire (see Table IV) 
Number of employees (see Table IV) 
Founded by CEO and family firms (1) versus 
otherwise (0) 
CEO with (1) versus without (0) academic 
certificate 
Number of former employers (outside experience) 
and tenure (inside experience in years) within the 
current firm of CEO 
Combination of three financial proxies 
(see Table IV) 
NR 
Demand  NR 
NR  a 
Number of registered auditors (see Table V) 
Proportion of partners (see Table V) 
Proportion of auditors with academic 
certificate (see Table V) 
Proportion of (outside) experienced auditors 
(see Table V) 
Survivor or M&A status in 1992 
(see Table V)  b 
Number of firms in the industry at founding 
(see Table V) 
Founded between 1970-1973 (1) versus 
1974-1975 (0) (see Table V) 
NR ffi not relevant as the data cannot capture the associated variable. 
b Diaspora firms are excluded as this subsample contains insufficient size variance. 
TABLE XI 
Objective and subjective human capital in Flemish furniture 
firms: the impact of the CEO's education, experience and 
locus-of-control 
Variables  Regression coefficient  ~ 
Constant  0.38  (0.56) 
Size  -0.003*  (0.001) 
Ownership  0.78**  (0.36) 
Education  0.20  (0.31) 
Outside experience  -0.11  (0.09) 
Inside experience  0.01  (0.01) 
Locus-of-control  0.10"** (0.04) 
R-square  0.34 
F-value  3.98*** 
Sample size  54 
a Unstandardized regression coefficient with * p  < 0.10, 
￿9  * p < 0.05  and *** p < 0.01, and standard error in paren- 
thesis. 
(multiple  regression)  of  the  Flemish  furniture 
industry data. 
The findings confirm Section 5's (Table VI and, 
partly, VII) results  on the  statistically  significant 
impact of organizational size (opposing H3a) and 
CEO's locus-of-control trait  (supporting H7).  A 
new result is  the positive  and  significant coeffi- 
cient of the  ownership variable,  which provides 
support for H4a. That is, firms currently managed 
by  (family  of)  the  founder are  associated  with 
higher financial performance. This result is in line 
with the well-established principal-agent argument 
that  "inside"  managers have  more incentives  to 
behave in accordance with the firm's interest than 
their "outside" colleagues. However, none of the 
objective  human  capital  variables  (education, 
outside experience and inside experience through 
tenure)  generates  significant  results.  Thus,  the 
re-analysis of the whole Flemish furniture industry 
sample does not produce support for H5a or H6a. 
(Note,  additionally,  that  the  sign of the  outside 
experience measure even opposes our prediction.) 
So,  ownership  matters  in  both  the  Flemish 
furniture  as  well  as  the  Dutch  audit  industry. 
However, objective human capital -  reflected in 
education and experience of the CEO or personnel 
-  only  significantly  influences  organizational 
performance in the latter industry (Section 6). For 
this, at least three explanations may be plausible. 
First, the effect of subjective human capital in the 
form  of  the  CEO's  locus-of-control  trait  -  as 360  Christophe Boone and Arjen van Witteloostuijn 
measured for the Flemish furniture but not for the 
Dutch audit industry sample -  may dominate over 
the impact of the CEO's objective human  capital 
features because the craft of producing  furniture 
requires  teamwork  with  an  important  role  for 
leadership. Second, the nature of the Flemish fur- 
niture  industry  is  radically  different  from  the 
Dutch  audit  industry's  (Section  4).  Particularly 
relevant may be two observations: (i) the Flemish 
furniture  industry,  as opposed to the Dutch audit 
market,  is engaged in fierce (international)  com- 
petition,  whereas competition  in the Dutch audit 
industry  resembles  career  rather  than  product 
market rivalry  (recall  that  in  the latter  industry 
bankruptcies  are  virtually  absent);  and  (ii)  the 
Dutch  audit  industry  produces  an  intellectual 
service requiring highly educated and experienced 
personnel,  implying  that  by  the  nature  of  the 
product the objective human capital features under 
study here  are a competitive asset (which is not 
true  for furniture  firms).  Related to this  second 
explanation  is  the  argument  that  reputation,  as 
reflected  in  academic  titles,  is  an  important 
demand-enhancing  factor  in  the  audit  industry. 
Third,  the  results  may  be  different  for  small 
compared to large firms, either of which may be 
overrepresented in either sample. It is to this final 
issue that we now turn. 
Additionally  to the inter-industry  comparison 
(Tables VIII and XI), the data can be re-analyzed 
to discover size effects (H8). To this  aim,  Table 
XII  reports  the  findings  for  large  versus  small 
firms  in  the  Flemish  furniture  (>  50  and  <  50 
employees, respectively) and Dutch audit industry 
(> 1 and 1 auditor, respectively: note that for small 
firms the proportion of owners is 1 by definition). 
What is  striking  about the results,  is that the 
impact  of the  human  capital  variables  is  more 
TABLE XII 
The impact of human capital in large versus small firms 
Variables  Small  Large  Small  Small  Mann-  Large  Large  Mann- 
furniture  furniture  surviving  M&A audit  Whitney  c  surviving  M&A audit  Whitney  c 
firms  ~  firms  a  audit firms  b  firms  b  audit firms  b  finns  b 
Constant  0.22  1.39 
(1.17)  (0.83) 
Locu s-of-control  0.10  0.12"* 
(0.06)  (0.06) 
Size  0.04  -0.005** 
(0.02)  (0.002) 
Ownership  0.59  0.40 
(0.56)  (0.53) 
Education  -0.78  0.88**  0.29  0.33 
(0.51)  (0.39)  (0.43)  (0.49) 
Outside experience  -0.03  -0.33  0.61  0.58 
(0.15)  (0.21 )  (0.50)  (0.51 ) 
Inside experience  0.008  0.006 
(0.O2)  (0.O2) 
Density  277.35  279.58 
(15.42)  (16.56) 
Demand  0.48  0.83 
(0.51)  (0.39) 
R-square  0.22  0.59 
F-value  0.97  4.87*** 
Sample size  27  27  31  12 
0.393 
0.430 
0.92  0.91  0.458 
(0.14)  (0.20) 
0.36  0.49  0.104 
(0.31)  0.27) 
0.73  0.91  0.094 
(0.37)  (0.18) 
0.335  283.55  273.67  0.063 
(18.46)  (11.08) 
0.020  0.73  0.40  0.052 
(0.47)  (0.51) 
11  15 
Unstandardized regression coefficient with * p  < 0.10, ** p  < 0.05 and *** p  < 0.01, and standard error in parenthesis. 
b  Average values with standard deviation in parenthesis. 
c  One-tailed p-value with statistically significant values printed in bold. Human  Capital  361 
pronounced in large rather than small firms in both 
industries.  This  opposes H8. In the Flemish fur- 
niture industry, the positive influence of the large- 
firm  CEO's  education  and  internality  is  in  line 
with  H5a  and  H7.  What  is  surprising  is  the 
negative -  and nearly significant -  impact of the 
CEO's education (with a regression coefficient of 
-0.78) in small firms, and the negative sign of the 
outside experience variable in both small and large 
businesses (with regression coefficients of-0.03 
and -0.33, respectively) -  opposing H5a and H6a. 
(The  tenure  variable  does  not  work  at  all.) 
Apparently,  the  CEO's  academic  education  and 
outside experience may be counterproductive in 
this industry. As yet, we have no explanation  for 
these  surprising  results, t3  In  the  Dutch  audit 
industry,  all findings  are in  line  with the results 
for the complete sample, as reported in Section 6. 
There,  we  proposed  a  career  and  takeover 
argument  to explain the  set of results relating  to 
the human capital features of the auditors in large 
M&A and diaspora firms as opposed to their small 
and  surviving  counterparts.  For example,  large 
firms  with  highly  educated  (and  moderately  to 
highly experienced) personnel are more attractive 
takeover candidates (15 from 26 large entrants are 
merged or acquired in  1992 versus  12 from 43 of 
their small colleagues), t4 
A  final statistically significant result relates to 
the  size-dependent effect of demand at founding 
on large versus small-firm survival chances in the 
Dutch  audit  industry.  Here,  small  audit  firms 
established in  times  of (relatively)  low demand 
(1970-1973)  suffer from  higher  mortality  rates 
than the large collaegue entrants (with an average 
value of the demand variable of 0.83 versus  0.40 
of the M&A firms). Or, in other words: large low- 
demand entrants face a significantly lower likeli- 
hood of exit through  M&A  (at  1992)  than  their 
small  low-demand  counterparts.  This  finding 
suggests  that  large  entrants  can  benefit  from  a 
(tangible  and/or  intangible)  buffer,  contrary  to 
small entrants, in years of (relatively) unfavorable 
demand  (cf.  Fichman  &  Levinthal's,  1991, 
argument on the buffer-related honeymoon period 
after entry). 
8.  Appraisal 
The message of this paper is four-fold. First, from 
a theoretical perspective the argument is a plea for 
integrating  three  strands  in  the  literature  while 
studying organizational performance: the belief is 
that  the  combination  of industrial  organization, 
organizational  ecology and human  capital  argu- 
ments  induces  added  value  (Sections  2  and  3). 
Second, the cross-section  study in the Flemish fur- 
niture  industry emphasizes the role of subjective 
human capital -  particularly  the CEO's locus-of- 
control  trait  -  in determining  a  firm's financial 
performance  (Section 5).  Third,  the longitudinal 
study  in  the  Dutch  audit  industry  reveals  the 
importance  of objective  human  capital -  specifi- 
cally education  and experience -  as an explana- 
tory variable of organizational  survival  (Section 
6). Moreover, both studies introduce IO and/or OE 
elements  by incorporating  variables that capture 
aspects  of market  structure  (concentration  and 
density  at founding  in  the  Dutch audit  industry 
study) and  competitive strategy  (cost leadership 
and product differentiation  in the Flemish furni- 
ture  industry  study). Fourth,  a preliminary  com- 
parison  of  both  samples  concentrates  on  the 
impact  of industry  and  size-specific  features  in 
explaining organizational performance (Section 7). 
A  number  of results  stands  out:  (i)  the  CEO's 
locus-of-control trait  significantly  contributes to 
explaining  financial  performance of Flemish fur- 
niture  firms;  (ii) both education  and experience 
of the personnel of Dutch audit firm entrants  are 
able to discriminate  surviving  from M&A from 
diaspora firms;  (iii)  in the Flemish furniture  and 
Dutch audit industry, large scale is a disadvantage. 
Moreover,  the  results  are  more  pronounced  for 
large finns in both industries. 
As said in the introduction, the combination of 
all pieces hopefully illustrates the added value of 
an integrative approach -  the puzzle -  to the study 
of organizational  success and failure.  However, 
this paper only describes part of the puzzle, since 
the data are as yet unable to cover the full picture. 
Our future research efforts will be directed at com- 
pleting  the puzzle,  probably piece by piece.  By 
way of example, we conclude this paper by briefly 
indicating  three  planned  future  analyses  of the 
Dutch audit industry data. For one, we will re-do 
this paper's  analyses after enlarging  the  data set 362  Christophe Boone and Arjen van Witteloostuijn 
by including entrants from the pre-1970 and post- 
1975  periods in the data set.  Next, we will elabo- 
rate  on the  IO  and OE-type  of market  evolution 
and selection arguments -  for example, by an in- 
depth  study  of the dual  market  structure  hypoth- 
esis. Finally, the preliminary results of this paper's 
pilot  study  suggest  that  analyses  on  career 
elements  of  auditors  may  produce  an  important 
contribution  to  the  explanation  of  the  ups  and 
downs  of audit firms. 15  In all cases,  we  will dif- 
ferentiate  the  results  by  distinguishing (at  least) 
four  different  destinations  of  firms:  survival, 
merger,  acquisition and diaspora. 
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Notes 
Note that Audretsch (1994, p.  125) recently observed that 
"It]he handful of empirical studies analysing exit [in IO] have 
generally  concluded  that  the  determinants  of  exit  are 
symmetric to those for entry. However, these studies have 
typically  been  limited  to  examining  broadly  aggregated 
industry rates of entry and exit. In addition, there has been 
virtually no attempt to identify the characteristics of firms 
exiting from the industry" (first emphasis added).  A recent 
example of such entry and exit rate studies is Mata (1994). 
The Dutch audit industry study reported in Section 6  is, as 
Audretsch's (1994), on the individual firm level. 
2  The fact that Table I lists differences in emphasis cannot 
be  overemphasized.  The  concentration-density contrast  is 
illustrative here. For example, many concentration indices in 
IO take account of the number of firms and Sutton's (1991) 
dual market structure argument underlines the co-existence 
of high concentration and high density. 
3  Again, this is only a  difference in emphasis.  In effect, 
profitability and survival may be -  though not necessarily so 
(Winter, 1975; Van Witteloostuijn, 1988) -  two sides of the 
same coin. 
4  Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven (1990, p. 527) conclude their 
paper by arguing that "[w]hat remains to be done are analyses 
of  how  founding  conditions  influence  other  important 
outcomes such as survival  and profitability of young firms" 
(emphasis added). Section 6 is an example of a study focusing 
on the founding characteristics -  survival nexus. 
Here a  panel design, following cohorts of entrants over 
the  years,  would be convenient (but expensive and  time- 
consuming). 
6  Another example is Van de Ven et al. (1984). However, 
their study is really exploratory in nature as their sample is 
composed of only 14 educational-software companies in the 
U.S. 
7  The number of observations in Table VI (N  =  55:  OLS 
regression) is considerably larger than the number in Table 
VII (N -  39: hierarchical regression) due to the fact that only 
a subsample of the participating firms revealed strategy data. 
However, considering the small sample we decided to include 
all observations in the OLS regression underlying Table VI. 
s  For the sake of brevity, strategy -  locus-of-control inter- 
action effects are not reported here. For this, see Boone and 
De Brabander (1994). 
9  Note, by the way, that in this industry (i) a cost leadership 
strategy  is  far  more  effective  than  a  strategy  of  product 
differentiation and (ii) internal CEOs are more inclined to opt 
for a product differentiation strategy (for possible explana- 
tions, see Boone and De Brabander, 1994). 
~o  In the Dutch audit market, "real" failures in the form of 
bankruptcies are virtually absent. Audit firms ceasing to exist 
for other reasons than M&A or diaspora appear to exit from 
the market following the death or retirement of the associ- 
ated auditor(s). Therefore, we dropped these firms (N -  22) 
from our sample. 
~1  The data permit to distinguish mergers from acquisitions 
on the basis of a number of plausible criteria (Pennings, Lee 
and Van Witteloostuijn, 1995).  However, given the limited 
number of observations (N = 27 for M&A), we decided not 
to do so in the current pilot study. 
~2  The pattern of results generated by multivariate logistic 
regression analyses does not deviate much from the univariate 
findings reported in Table VIII. Given the limited number of 
observation (N =  78), we only report the findings from the 
univariate Kruskal-Wallis and Mann-Whitney tests. 
~3  Of  course,  the  small  sample  size  may  imply  biases. 
However, note that the size effect occurs in both samples. 
~4  In a way, the adjectives "large" and "small" in our Dutch 
audit industry sample should be interpreted with caution, as 
even the largest firm in the sample features 41 auditors only 
(Table V). That is, all firms in the data set are small, although 
some are smaller than others. The former is not true for the 
Flemish furniture industry sample, because the largest firm 
here has 417 employees (Table IV). 
~5  The career data are promising. The NIvRA membership 
lists (and those of NIvRA's predecessors) contain information 
(approximately on a two-year basis) on the jobs, including the 
names of the respective audit firms or outside enterprises, of 
all  Dutch registered  auditors  (RAs) for,  say,  the  post-war 
period (Buijink et al.,  1994). 
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